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RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED FIELD ESTIMATION ∗
YUAN CHEN † , SOUMMYA KAR † , AND JOSE´ M. F. MOURA†
Abstract. We study resilient distributed field estimation under measurement attacks. A net-
work of agents or devices measures a large, spatially distributed physical field parameter. An ad-
versary arbitrarily manipulates the measurements of some of the agents. Each agent’s goal is to
process its measurements and information received from its neighbors to estimate only a few specific
components of the field. We present SAFE, the Saturating Adaptive Field Estimator, a consen-
sus+innovations distributed field estimator that is resilient to measurement attacks. Under sufficient
conditions on the compromised measurement streams, the physical coupling between the field and
the agents’ measurements, and the connectivity of the cyber communication network, SAFE guar-
antees that each agent’s estimate converges almost surely to the true value of the components of the
parameter in which the agent is interested. Finally, we illustrate the performance of SAFE through
numerical examples.
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1. Introduction. This paper is concerned with resilient distributed field esti-
mation under measurement attacks. We design a distributed estimator that we refer
to as the Saturating Adaptive Field Estimator (SAFE) of a large dimensional un-
known field when an adversary arbitrarily changes some of the agents’ measurements.
In contrast to existing work on resilient distributed estimation, each agent is only
interested in estimating a fraction of the field, instead of the entire field. Under ap-
propriate conditions, we prove strong consistency of each agent’s estimate. When
the unknown field is very large, SAFE dramatically reduces the local processing and
communication at each agent, making it better suited in practical scenarios.
1.1. Motivation. The Internet of Things (IoT) brings about many multi-agent
systems applications, such as road side unit (RSU) networks for monitoring traffic and
controlling traffic signals in smart cities [32], teams of robots mapping an unknown
environment [13], or state estimation in the power grid [17]. In these applications, the
individual devices measure a component or a few components of a spatially distributed
field and process their data to learn about their physical surroundings. For example,
in traffic management, the network of road side units estimates traffic conditions
throughout the entire city (a large, spatially distributed field) to effectively control
traffic signals [3, 32].
This paper studies distributed field estimation [28]. A team of agents or devices
makes repeated (over time) local measurements of an unknown spatially distributed
field. That is, each agent’s measurements are physically coupled to only a few com-
ponents of the field. The agents process their measurements and the information
they receive from neighbors over a cyber communication network. Each agent only
estimates a portion of the unknown field, because, due to the size of the field, it is
infeasible for each individual agent to estimate the entire field. This contrasts with
common distributed estimation settings where, even though the agents make local
measurements, the goal of each agent is to estimate the entire field. Certain IoT
setups involve large numbers of devices, distributed throughout a large physical envi-
∗
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ronment, so it is unrealistic for every agent to estimate the entire field. In multi-robot
navigation and mapping, for example, each robot only measures its local surroundings
(instead of the entire unknown environment), and, through collaboration with close-
by neighbors, also only estimates the field in nearby locations. Similarly, in smart
cities, each road side unit (RSU) may be tasked with monitoring the traffic within
a local neighborhood, instead of estimating the state of traffic throughout the entire
city.
Security is a prominent challenge in deploying IoT applications as individual
devices are vulnerable to adversarial cyber-attacks. Autonomous vehicles and mobile
robots, for example, may fall victim to cyber-attacks that manipulate its onboard
sensors and hijack its control systems [14,16]. Without adequate damage mitigation,
compromised devices jeopardize the functionality and reliability of these team based
systems. In this paper, we focus on data and measurement attacks, where an adversary
manipulates a subset of the agents’ measurements, arbitrarily changing their data.
Our goal is to ensure that all of the agents, even those with compromised measurement
streams, consistently estimate the fraction of the field in which they are interested. To
this end, we present SAFE, the Saturating Adaptive Field Estimator, a distributed
field estimator that is resilient to measurement attacks.
1.2. Literature Review. Existing work in resilient multi-agent computation
has focused on problems where the agents share a common (homogeneous) processing
objective. In the classic Byzantine generals problem, a group of loyal agents must
agree on whether or not to attack an enemy city while treacherous agents attempt
to disrupt the decision-making process [24]. The agents pass messages to each other,
following a specific protocol in an all-to-all communication scheme, and reach a con-
sensus on their decision as long as more than two thirds of the agents are loyal [12,24].
References [10, 25, 26] study resilient multi-agent consensus in the presence of adver-
saries over sparse (i.e., not all-to-all) communication topologies. One application of
resilient consensus is robot gathering [1], where a team of robots must rendezvous at
a particular location. Reference [1] designs a robot gathering algorithm that may tol-
erate Byzantine failures. In these consensus problems [1,10,24–26], the (loyal) agents
share the same goal: to reach agreement on a decision or value.
Beyond consensus, prior work in resilient inference has also focused on problems
where the agents have a common objective. In inference tasks, agents process their
measurements to perform hypothesis testing or to recover an unknown parameter.
This differs from consensus tasks, where there are no measurements involved and
agents only need to reach agreement. References [11, 27, 29] address resilient state
estimation under data attacks in centralized, single-agent systems. References [2, 18,
31, 33, 34] study decentralized Byzantine inference, where agents transmit local data
or decisions to a fusion center for processing. Adversarial (Byzantine) agents transmit
falsified data to the fusion center whose goal is to recover the parameter without being
misled by the adversarial agents.
Our prior work has addressed resilient estimation in fully distributed settings (no
fusion center) in the presence of Byzantine agents [6,7] and measurement attacks [8].
In [6–8], each agent in a network of agents makes partial measurements of an un-
known parameter and all of the agents attempt to estimate the entire parameter in
the presence of adversarial attacks. That is, all of the agents share the same esti-
mation goal. In distributed settings, aside from resilient estimation, another relevant
problem is resilient optimization [30,35], where a team of agents, each with access to
its own local objective function, cooperate to optimize a single global objective (e.g.,
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the sum of their local objective functions). Reference [30] designs countermeasures
to mitigate the damage from adversarial agents in distributed optimization tasks,
and reference [35] solves attack resilient vehicular formation control as a distributed
optimization problem.
1.3. Summary of Contributions. Unlike the existing work in resilient consen-
sus [1,10,12,24–26], centralized and decentralized inference [2,11,18,27,29,31,33,34],
distributed parameter estimation [6–8] and optimization [30, 35], which all study se-
tups with a common processing objective, in this paper, we consider the case when
agents have different heterogeneous estimation goals. In particular, we study resilient
distributed field estimation, where each agent seeks to estimate only a few components
of a high-dimensional spatially distributed field parameter while under measurement
attacks. The problem of each agent only estimating a few components of the field
was previously considered in reference [28] with static fields and reference [23] that
estimated time-varying random fields by designing distributed Kalman Filters, but
neither considered adversarial attacks on the agents. This paper studies distributed
field estimation with attacks on the agents.
We consider a setup that is similar to the setup of our previous work [8]: a team of
agents each makes noisy measurements (over time) of a fraction of an unknown field
parameter, and an adversary arbitrarily manipulates some of these measurements.
The goal in this paper, however, is different than the goal in [8]. In [8], each agent
attempts to estimate the entire unknown parameter, while, here, each agent attempts,
in collaboration with nearby neighbors, to estimate only a portion of the unknown
parameter in which it is interested. Hence, the setup here is more practical than in [8]
when fields are spatially very large (for example, in monitoring traffic conditions over
a city [32] or in field estimation in the power grid [17]).
Because each agent only estimates a fraction of the field, there are major difficul-
ties not addressed in [8] that we successfully consider here. Namely, since neighboring
agents may be interested in different portions of the field, each agent must addition-
ally process the data received from its neighbors to extract the information relevant
to the portion of the field that it wishes to estimate. This leads to several technical
differences between our work here and [8]. First, the heterogenous processing goals in-
duce different topology conditions on the communication network. Second, the notion
of consensus needs to be appropriately modified, as agents are no longer interested in
reaching an exact consensus on the entire parameter. Rather, the focus is to attain
consensus on overlapping components of interest. This changes the nature of the dy-
namics and interactions between the agents and requires new analysis methods that
we develop in this paper.
This paper describes SAFE, the Saturating Adaptive Fields Estimator, a dis-
tributed field estimator that is resilient to measurement attacks. SAFE is a con-
sensus+innovations estimator [19, 22] where each agent iteratively updates a local
estimate as a weighted sum of its previous estimate, its neighbors’ estimates, and
its local innovation, the difference between the agent’s observed measurement and
predicted measurement (based on its estimate). In the estimate update, each agent
applies an adaptive gain to its local innovation to ensure that its magnitude is below
a time-varying threshold. A key challenge for SAFE is designing this threshold to
mitigate the effect of compromised measurements without limiting the information
from the uncompromised measurements. The performance of SAFE critically de-
pends on properly selecting the weights and threshold used in the estimate update.
We provide a procedure to select this properly, and we show that, under sufficient
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conditions on the compromised measurement streams and the relationship between
the physical coupling and the cyber communication network, SAFE guarantees that
all of the agents’ estimates are strongly consistent, i.e., each agent’s estimate con-
verges to the true value of the portion of the field that it seeks to estimate. To prove
consistency, we first show that, for each component of the field, all interested agents
reach consensus in their estimates, and then we show that the value of the estimate
on which the agents agree converges almost surely to the true value of the field.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide back-
ground on the measurement, communication, and attack models, and we formalize
the resilient distributed field estimation task. Section 3 presents SAFE, a distributed
field estimator that is resilient to measurement attacks. In Section 4, we show that,
under sufficient conditions on the compromised measurement streams, the physical
coupling of the parameter to the measurement streams, and the connectivity of the
cyber communication network, SAFE ensures strongly consistent local estimates.
Section 5 illustrates the performance of SAFE through numerical examples, and we
conclude in Section 6.
2. Background. This section reviews notation and background on the mea-
surement, communication, and attack models, and formalizes the distributed field
estimation task.
2.1. Notation. Let Rk be the k dimensional Euclidean space, Ik the k by k
identity matrix, and 1k the k dimensional vector of ones. The column vector ej ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , k, is the jth canonical basis vector of Rk: ej is a column vector with 1 in
the jth row and 0 everywhere else. The operators ‖·‖2 and ‖·‖∞ are, respectively, the
`2 norm and the `∞ norm. For matrices A and B, A ⊗ B is the Kronecker product.
For a symmetric matrix A = Aᵀ, A  0 (A  0) means that A is positive semidefinite
(positive definite). For a matrix A, [A]i,j is the element in its i
th row and jth. For a
vector v, [v]i is its i
th component.
Let G = (V,E) be a simple undirected graph (no self loops or multiple edges) with
vertex set V = {1, . . . , N} and edge set E. The neighborhood of vertex n, Ωn, is the
set of vertices that share an edge with n, and dn is the size of its neighborhood |Ωn|.
For the graph G, let D = diag(d1, . . . , dN ) be the degree matrix, A, where [A]n,l = 1
if (n, l) ∈ E and [A]n,l = 0 otherwise, be the adjacency matrix, and L = D − A be
the Laplacian matrix. The Laplacian matrix L has ordered eigenvalues 0 = λ1(L) ≤
· · · ≤ λN (L), and eigenvector 1N associated with the eigenvalue λ1(L) = 0. For a
connected graph G, λ2(L) > 0. References [4,9] provide additional details on spectral
graph theory.
In this paper, all random objects are defined on a common probability space
(Ω,F) equipped with a filtration Ft. Reference [5] reviews stochastic processes and
filtrations. The operators P (·) and E (·) are the probability and expectation operators,
respectively. All inequalities involving random variables hold almost surely (a.s.), i.e.,
with probability 1, unless otherwise stated.
2.2. Measurement Model. Consider a field over a large physical area repre-
sented by the unknown, static (field) parameter θ∗ ∈ RM . A network of N agents or
devices {1, 2, . . . , N} makes local streams of measurements of the field. At each time
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , every agent n makes a local measurement
(2.1) yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ + wn(t),
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where wn(t) is the local measurement noise. The measurement yn(t) has dimension
Pn, i.e., at each time t, it makes Pn scalar measurements, with Pn << M , where M
is the dimension of the field parameter θ∗.
Assumption 1. The measurement noise wn(t) is temporally independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and covariance matrix Σn. The mea-
surement noise is independent across agents. The sequence {wn(t)} is Ft+1 adapted
and independent of Ft.
The filtration Ft in Assumption 1 will be defined shortly. We use the same mea-
surement model as [8], but, as we will detail in 2.3, this paper studies a different
estimation problem. In [8], every agent attempts to estimate the entire parameter θ∗,
while, here, each agent attempts to estimate only a few components of θ∗.
The matrix Hn is the local measurement matrix of agent n and models the phys-
ical coupling between the field θ∗ and the local measurements yn(t). It states which
components of the field affect the measurement yn(t). Each agent knows its mea-
surement matrix Hn a priori. We assume Hn is sparse, which means that the mea-
surement (2.1) provides information on only a few components of θ∗, i.e., each agent’s
measurement streams are only coupled to a few components of the (high-dimensional)
field parameter. For example, in a robotic mapping and navigation application, where
a team of robots attempts to estimate the locations of obstacles, each robot’s local
measurements only depend on its surroundings. If each component of θ∗ represents
the state of a particular location (e.g., if a location is occupied by an obstacle), then,
each robot only measures its local surroundings, and the local measurements are phys-
ically coupled to only a few components of θ∗, corresponding to nearby locations.
The measurement matrix Hn ∈ RPn×M captures the physical coupling between the
measurements yn(t) and the field θ
∗. The local measurement streams of agent n are
physically related to the mth component of θ∗ if one or more entries of the mth col-
umn of Hn are nonzero. For each agent n = 1, . . . , N , we formally define the physical
coupling set I˜n as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Physical Coupling Set). For each agent n, the physical coupling
set I˜n is the set of all components of θ∗ that affect its local measurement yn(t). For-
mally, I˜n is the set of indices corresponding to nonzero columns of Hn, i.e.,
(2.2) I˜n = {m ∈ {1, . . .M} |Hnem 6= 0} ,
where em is the m
th canonical (column) vector of RM .
Through its measurement yn(t), agent n collects information about the components
of θ∗ specified by its physical coupling set.
We now describe the indexing convention from [8] for labeling all of the agents’
measurements. Let yt stack all of the agents’ measurements at time t, i.e.,
(2.3) yt =
[
yᵀ1 (t) · · · yᵀN (t)
]ᵀ
= Hθ∗ + wt,
where wt =
[
wᵀ1 (t) · · · wᵀN (t)
]ᵀ
and H = [ Hᵀ1 · · · HᵀN ]ᵀ are the stacked
measurement noises and measurement matrices (H1, . . . ,HN ), respectively. The vec-
tor yt has dimension P =
∑N
n=1 Pn. In (2.3), we represent yt as the stack or con-
catenation of the vectors y1(t), . . . , yN (t). We now represent yt as the concatenation
of scalars, labeling each scalar component of yt from 1 to P :
(2.4) yt =
[
y(1)(t) · · · y(P1)(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yᵀ1 (t)
· · · y(PN+1)(t) · · · y(P )(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
yᵀN (t)
]ᵀ
,
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where P 0 = 0 and Pn =
∑n−1
j=1 Pj for n = 2, . . . , N . In (2.4), each element y
(p)(t), p =
1, . . . , P , is a scalar.1 The scalar components y(1)(t), . . . , y(P1)(t) make up the vector
measurement y1(t) for agent 1 at time t, and, in general, the vector measurement of
agent n at time t is made up of the scalar components
(2.5) yn(t) =
[
y(Pn+1)(t) · · · y(Pn+Pn)(t)
]ᵀ
.
Following [8], we now define measurement streams as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Measurement Stream [8]). A measurement stream is the collec-
tion of the scalar measurement y(p)(t) over all times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where p is the
index assigned in (2.3). 
For the rest of this paper, we refer to a measurement stream by its component index
p. The set P = {1, . . . , P} is the collection of all measurement streams. Following
the convention of (2.4) and (2.5), we also label the rows of H from 1 to P , i.e.,
H = [ h1 · · · hP ]ᵀ, subject to the following assumption:
Assumption 2. The measurement vectors hp, p = 1, . . . , P , have unit `2 norm,
i.e., ‖hp‖2 = 1.
2.3. Distributed Field Estimation. Up to here, the problem set up is similar
to that of [8], where every agent attempts to estimate the entire parameter θ∗. In this
paper, unlike in [8], the goal of each agent n is to estimate a subset of the components
of θ∗ as specified by its interest set In.
Definition 2.3 (Interest Set). For each agent n, the interest set In is the
ordered set of indices corresponding to the components of θ∗ that it wishes to estimate.
Each interest set In is a subset of {1, . . . ,M}, where M is the dimension of θ∗. We
now review the indexing convention for interest sets from [28]. For r = 1, . . . , |In|, the
expression In(r) = m means that the rth element of the interest set In is component
index m, and the expression I−1n (m) = r means that component index m is the rth
element of the interest set In. The elements of each interest set In are in ascending
order, i.e., In(1) < In(2) < · · · < In (|In|). Following [28], we assume that, for each
agent, the physical coupling set is a subset of the interest set:
Assumption 3. The physical coupling set I˜n is a subset of the interest set In.
Assumption 3 states that each agent n is at least interested in estimating all compo-
nents of the parameter that are coupled to its local measurement streams. There is a
relationship between the measurement matrix Hn and the interest set In. As a conse-
quence of Assumption 3, each interest set In must include the indices corresponding
to the nonzero columns Hn (see (2.2)). In this paper, the interest set In need not
depend on the inter-agent communication network.
In addition to the interest set In, which collects all of the components in which
agent n is interested, we also need to keep track of all agents interested in a particular
component. For each m = 1, . . . ,M , define the set
(2.6) Jm = {n ∈ {1, . . . , N} |m ∈ In} .
as the set of all agents that are interested in estimating the component m of the
field θ∗.
1The variable p indexes the scalar components.
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Assumption 4. For all m = 1, . . . ,M , |Jm| > 0.
Assumption 4 states that for each component of θ∗, there is at least one interested
agent. There does not need to be a single agent interested in estimating all components
of θ∗.
An important concept in estimation tasks is global observability, that we define
next in context of parameter estimation.
Definition 2.4 (Global Observability). Consider a set of measurement streams
X = {p1, . . . , p|X |} ⊆ P, and let HX = [ hp1 · · · hp|X| ]ᵀ be the matrix that stacks
all measurement vectors associated with streams in X . The set X is globally observable
if the M ×M observability Grammian GX = HᵀXHX =
∑
p∈X hph
ᵀ
p is invertible. 
If a set of measurement streams is globally observable, then, when there is no mea-
surement noise, it is possible to unambiguously determine θ∗ using a single snapshot
in time of the measurements in X .
Assumption 5. The set of all measurement streams P is globally observable.
Even a centralized estimator, which has access to all measurement streams, requires
global observabilty to construct a consistent estimate. So, it makes sense to assume it
in our distributed setting. Assumption 5 is standard in previous work on distributed
estimation [20,22,28].
While we assume global observabilty, we do not require local observability. An
individual agent most likely does not have enough information from its local mea-
surements alone to estimate all of the components in its interest set. For example,
in robotic mapping and navigation, a robot may be interested in estimating the state
of a location that it does not directly measure. To accomplish their estimation goals,
agents need to communicate with neighbors. We provide an example in Section 5
where agents must communicate with neighbors to accomplish their estimation goals.
They do this over a cyber communication network, modeled by a time varying graph
G(t) = (V,E(t)), where V is the set of all agents, and E(t) is the set of inter-agent
communication links at time t. For each agent n, Ωn(t) is its neighborhood at time
t. In real world conditions, their local cyber networks change, for example, due to
shadowing or random failures of local wireless channels.
Assumption 6. The Laplacians {L(t)} (of the graphs {G(t)}) form an i.i.d. se-
quence with mean E [L(t)] = L. The sequence {L(t)} is Ft+1-adapted and independent
of Ft. The sequence of Laplacians is independent of {wn(t)}.
In our setup, the only sources of randomness are the sequences {wn(t)}, n = 1, . . . , N
and {L(t)}. The filtration Ft is the natural filtration:
(2.7) Ft = σ (L0, . . . , Lt−1, w1(0), . . . , w1(t− 1), . . . , wN (0), . . . , wN (t− 1))
We make the following assumption about the relationship between the cyber-layer
communication network G(t) and the physical coupling between the components of θ∗
and the agents’ local measurements. For each parameter component m = 1, . . . ,M ,
let Gm(t) be the subgraph of G(t) induced by Jm, the agents that are interested in
the mth component.2 Recall that, as a consequence of Assumption 3, the set of agents
interested in a specific component of θ∗ includes the set of agents whose measurements
are physically coupled to that specific component.
2Gm(t) is the graph formed from G by the subset of agents (vertices) interested in the mth
component (Jm) and the subset of edges connecting pairs of agents in Jm.
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Assumption 7. For each component m = 1, . . . ,M of θ∗, let Lm(t) be the graph
Laplacian of the induced subgraph Gm(t), and let Lm = E [Lm(t)]. Then, Lm satsifies
(2.8) λ2(Lm) > 0,
for each m = 1, . . . ,M .
The communication network induced by Jm is connected on average for every m =
1, . . . ,M . That is, the mean Laplacian Lm satisifies the connectivity condition (2.8).
Assumption 7 is a sufficient condition for consistent distributed field estimation in
the absence of adversarial attacks [28]. We assume it also in this paper for distributed
field estimation in the presence of adversaries.
2.4. Attack Model. A malicious attacker corrupts a subset of the measurement
streams, replacing the true measurements with arbitrary values, modeled as
(2.9) yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ + wn(t) + an(t).
The attacks may be either deterministic or random, and the agents are unaware, a
priori, of how the attacker chooses an(t). We seek to ensure that all agents consis-
tently estimate their components of interest regardless of how the attacked is carried
out. Using the same indexing convention as (2.5), we label each scalar component
of an(t) with the indices Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn, where, recall Pn =
∑n−1
j=1 Pn. That
is, an(t) =
[
a(Pn+1)(t) · · · a(Pn+Pn)(t)
]ᵀ
. We consider measurement stream p
(p = 1, . . . , P ) to be compromised or under attack if, at any time t = 0, 1, . . . , the
scalar attack element a(p)(t) 6= 0. The set of all measurement streams P may be
partitioned into a set of compromised measurement streams
(2.10) A =
{
p ∈ P
∣∣∣∃t = 0, 1, . . . , a(p)(t) 6= 0} ,
and a set of uncompromised measurement streams N = P \ A. These sets do not
change over time, and agents do not know which measurement streams are compro-
mised. The attacker satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption 8. The attacker may only manipulate a subset (but not all) of the
measurement streams, i.e., 0 ≤ |A| < P .
3. SAFE: Saturating Adaptive Field Estimator. In this section, we de-
scribe SAFE, the Saturating Adaptive Field Estimator, a distributed field estimator
that is resilient to measurement attacks. SAFE is a consensus + innovations estima-
tor [19, 22], and it is the resilient version of the distributed field estimator from [28].
That is, SAFE copes with measurement attacks while the estimator from [28] does
not. SAFE is based on the Saturating Adaptive Gain Estimator (SAGE) for resilient
distributed parameter estimation we presented in [8]. In [8], every agent is intersted
in estimating the entire parameter θ∗ while under measurement attacks. Unlike [8]
(SAGE), this paper (SAFE) addresses resilient distributed field estimation, where
each agent is only interested in estimating a subset of the components of θ∗.
3.1. Algorithm. In SAFE, each agent n maintains a |In|-dimensional local es-
timate xn(t) ∈ R|In| of all of the components of θ∗ which it is interested in estimating,
where the ith component of xn(t) is an estimate of the i
th member of the interest set
In. Each agent initializes its estimate as xn(0) = 0. Then each iteration of SAFE
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consists of three steps: 1.) message passing, 2.) message processing, and 3.) estimate
update.
Message Passing: Each agent n communicates its current estimate xn(t) to each
of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn(t).
Message Processing: Neighboring agents may be interested in different compo-
nents of θ∗. Each agent n extracts only the information, from its neighbors’ estimates,
about the components of θ∗ it is interested in estimating and ignores the irrelevant
information. The agents use the following message processing procedure. Each agent
n receives xl(t) from each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn(t). Then, agent n constructs a
censored version, xcl,n(t), of the estimate from agent l element-wise as follows:
(3.1)
[
xcl,n(t)
]
i
=
{
[xl(t)]I−1l (In(i)) , if In(i) ∈ Il,
0, otherwise.
Agent n constructs the censored message xcl,n(t) element-wise by placing the j
th el-
ement of xl(t), where j = I−1l (In(i)) (i.e., agent l’s estimate of [θ∗]In(i), following
the indexing convention for interest sets introduced in Section 2.3), in the ith element
of xcl,n(t) if agent l is also interested in In(i), and placing zero in the ith element
otherwise.
In addition to processing its neighbors’ estimates, each agent n also needs to
compute a processed version of its own estimate for the estimate update step. For
each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn(t), agent n constructs xpl,n, a processed version of its own
estimate, element-wise as follows:
(3.2)
[
xpl,n(t)
]
i
=
{
[xn(t)]i , if In(i) ∈ Il,
0, otherwise.
That is, xpl,n(t) preserves the i
th element of xn(t) if agent l is also interested in In(i)
and places zero in the other elements.
Estimate Update: Each agent maintains a time-averaged measurement:
(3.3) yn(t) =
t
t+ 1
yn(t− 1) +
1
t+ 1
yn(t),
with initial condition yn(−1) = 0. If measurement stream p is uncompromised (p ∈
N ), then, the time averaged version of p follows y(p) = hᵀpθ∗+w(p)(t), where w(p)(t) =
1
t+1
∑t
j=0 w
(p)(j). In addition to the time-averaged measurement yn(t), the estimate
update step requires the censored measurement matrix Hcn, which is the measurement
matrix Hn after removing all columns whose indices are not in In. The matrix Hcn
has Pn rows and |In| columns.
Each agent updates its estimate as
xn(t+ 1)=xn(t)− βt
∑
l∈Ωn(t)
(
xpl,n(t)− xcl,n(t)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neighborhood Consensus
+αtH
c
n
ᵀKn(t) (yn(t)−Hcnxn(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Local Innovation
,
(3.4)
where the innovations and consensus weight sequences αt > 0 and βt > 0 will be
defined shortly, and Kn(t) is a diagonal gain matrix that depends on yn(t)−Hcnxn(t).
Recall that, following (2.5), Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn are the indices for the components
of yn(t). For each p = Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn, define the scalar gain
(3.5) kp(t) = min
(
1, γt
∣∣∣y(p)(t)− hcpᵀxn(t)∣∣∣−1) ,
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where hcp
ᵀ is the row vector hᵀp after removing components whose indices are not in
In, and γt is a scalar threshold sequence that will be defined shortly. Then, Kn(t) is
defined as
(3.6) Kn(t) = diag
(
kPn+1(t), . . . , kPn+Pn(t)
)
.
The gain matrix Kn(t) clips (or saturates) each component of the local innovation
at the threshold level γt, i.e., it ensures that the `∞ norm of the scaled innovation,
‖Kn(t) (yn(t)−Hcnxn(t))‖∞, does not exceed the threshold γt. The goal in clipping
the local innovations is to limit the impact of measurement attacks on the estimate
update. The key challenge in designing the SAFE algorithm is selecting the threshold
sequence. If the threshold γt is not chosen correctly, we may limit the impact of
uncompromised measurement streams (p ∈ N ) on the estimate update. We choose
the threshold γt, along with the innovations and consensus weight sequences αt and
βt, to balance these two effects as follows:
1. The sequences {αt} and {βt} are given by αt = a(t+1)τ1 , βt = b(t+1)τ2 , where
a, b > 0 and 0 < τ2 < τ1 < 1.
2. The threshold sequence {γt} is given by γt = Γ(t+1)τγ , where Γ > 0 and
0 < τγ < min
(
1
2 , τ1 − τ2, 1− τ1
)
.
The innovations and consensus weight sequences decay in time, with the inno-
vation weight sequence {αt} decaying at a faster rate. The threshold sequence {γt}
also decays over time. Intuitively, the threshold γt decaying means that the esti-
mate update (3.4) allows initially for large contributions from the local innovation,
incorporating more information from the measurements. Then, as the number of
iterations increases, the local estimates should move closer to the true value of the
parameter, resulting in smaller magnitude local innovations for uncompromised mea-
surement streams. Accordingly, decreasing the threshold γt over time, we expect the
update (3.4) to limit the impact of compromised measurements while still incorpo-
rating enough information from the uncompromised measurements. The weight and
threshold selection is critical to the performance and resilience of SAFE. If these are
selected improperly, then, the performance guarantees, stated below, no longer hold.
In the distributed field estimation problem, each agent is only interested in es-
timating a few components of the parameter. This differs from the more common
distributed parameter estimation problem, like the setup of SAGE in [8], where ev-
ery agent is interested in estimating all components of the parameter. To account for
the different interest sets between neighboring agents, SAFE introduces a message
processing step (equations (3.1) and (3.2)), not found in SAGE [8], and uses the
processed messages in the estimate update. By handling different interest sets among
agents, SAFE is more general than SAGE: if all agents have the same interest set
In = {1, . . . ,M}, then, SAFE reduces to SAGE.
3.2. Main Result: Performance of SAFE. We now present our main result.
Define θ∗In element-wise as
[
θ∗In
]
i
= [θ∗]In(i) , for i = 1, . . . , |In|. That is, θ∗In is
the |In|-dimensional vector that collects the components of θ∗ in which agent n is
interested. The following theorem establishes the strong consistency of SAFE on the
local interest sets.
Theorem 3.1. Let A = {p1, . . . , p|A|} be the set of compromised measurement
streams, and let HA =
[
hp1 · · · hp|A|
]ᵀ
. If for the matrix GN =
∑
p∈N hph
ᵀ
p,
(3.7) λmin (GN ) > ∆A,
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where N = P \ A and ∆A = max
v∈R|A|,‖v‖∞≤1
‖HᵀAv‖2 , then, for all n and all 0 ≤ τ0 <
min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
, we have
(3.8) P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0
∥∥xn(t)− θ∗In∥∥2 = 0) = 1.
Theorem 3.1 states that, under the resilience condition in (3.7), SAFE ensures
that all of the agents’ local estimates converge a.s. to the true value of the param-
eter on their respective interest sets. The resilience condition (3.7) is a condition
on the global redundancy of the noncompromised measurement streams. Intuitively,
it states that the noncompromised measurement streams have enough redundancy
in measuring θ∗ to overcome the impact of the compromised measurement streams.
The resilience condition (3.7) for consistent distributed field estimation under mea-
surement attacks is the same resilience condition for consistent distributed parameter
estimation under measurement attacks [8]. Thus, the resilience of our distributed field
estimator SAFE does not depend on the agents’ local interest sets; it only depends
on which measurement streams are compromised.
The performance of SAFE also depends on the connectivity of the cyber com-
munication graph and the physical coupling between the parameter and the agents’
measurements. It is difficult to determine how the local neighborhood, Ωn(t), of a
single agent, n, directly affects the global dynamics of the algorithm. Thus, instead of
considering the local neighborhood structure Ωn(t), we provide a necessary condition
(for resilient field estimation) on the global topology of the communication network
G(t) Specifically, following Assumption 7, we require that, for each m = 1, . . . ,M
(i.e., each component of the parameter θ∗), the induced subgraph Gm(t) be connected
on average, i.e., λ2
(
Lm
)
> 0 for all m = 1, . . . ,M .
4. Performance Analysis. In this section, we prove Theorem 3.1, which states
that, under SAFE, all of the agents’ local estimates converge a.s. to the true value of
the parameter on their respective interest sets as long as the resilience condition (3.7)
is satisfied. Our analysis does not depend on the attacker’s strategy, i.e., how the
attacker chooses {an(t)}. We carry out our analysis over sample paths, and, in the
case of random attacks, we do not make any assumptions about the distribution or
statistics of {an(t)}. The proof depends on several existing intermediate results from
the literature [6, 8, 15] that are provided in the Appendix. All inequalities involving
random variables hold a.s. (with probability 1) unless otherwise stated.
Our proof requires new techniques not found in existing work on resilient dis-
tributed parameter estimation [8]. In distributed parameter estimation settings, we
show that the agents’ estimates all converge to the network average estimate, and
that the network average estimate converges to the true value of the parameter. This
method relies on the fact that all agents share the same estimation goal. In distributed
field estimation, each agent is only interested in and keeps track of a few components
of the parameter, which complicates the notion of the network average estimate. To
account for this complication, we analyze the consensus of the local estimates on
component-induced subgraphs Gm(t). That is, for each component of the unknown
parameter m = 1, . . . ,M , we consider the subgraph Gm(t) induced by agents who are
interested in estimating [θ∗]m and show that their estimates of [θ∗]m converge a.s. to
the network average estimate taken over Gm(t). Then, we show that the network
average estimate taken over Gm(t) converges a.s. to the true value of [θ
∗]m.
4.1. Auxiliary State Transformation. For convenience and clarity, before
proving Theorem 3.1, we introduce an auxiliary state variable for describing the evo-
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lution of the agents’ local estimates. We follow the convention provided in [28]. For
each agent n, we define the auxiliary state x˜n(t) ∈ RM as follows (recall that M is
the dimension of the parameter θ∗):
(4.1) [x˜n(t)]i =
{
[xn(t)]I−1n (i) , if i ∈ In,
0, otherwise,
for each i = 1, . . . ,M . That is, for each component i = 1, . . . ,M , if agent n is
interested in component i, then the ith component of x˜n(t) is agent n’s estimate of
[θ∗]i; otherwise, the ith component of x˜n(t) is zero. Further, for each agent n, define
the M ×M diagonal matrix
(4.2) Qn = diag (q
n
1 , . . . , q
n
M ) ,
where, for i = 1, . . . ,M ,
(4.3) qni =
{
1, if i ∈ In,
0, otherwise.
Recall that, for each agent n, the auxiliary interest set I˜n is the set of indices of
the nonzero columns of Hn, i.e., the components of the parameter that are coupled
to the measurement streams at agent n. Assumption 3 states that I˜n ⊆ In. As a
result of assumption 3 and the definition of qni , the following holds for each agent n:
HnQn = Hn. This is because q
n
i = 1 if the i
th column of Hn is nonzero.
From the estimate update rule (3.4), the auxiliary state x˜n(t) follows
x˜n(t+ 1)=x˜n(t)− βt
∑
l∈Ωn(t)
QnQl(x˜n(t)−x˜l(t)) + αtHᵀnKn(t) (yn(t)−Hnxn(t)) .(4.4)
Let x˜t =
[
x˜1(t)
ᵀ · · · x˜N (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
and yt =
[
y1(t)
ᵀ · · · yN (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
stack, respec-
tively, all of the agents’ auxiliary states and measurements at time t. To represent the
evolution of x˜t, we define the NM ×NM matrix Lt block-wise. Let [Lt]n,l ∈ RM×M
be the (n, l)-th sub-block of the matrix Lt, for n, l = 1, . . . , N , defined as
(4.5) [Lt]n,l =
{
−Qn
∑N
i=1:i6=n [L(t)]n,iQi, if n = l,
[L(t)]n,lQnQl, otherwise.
In (4.5), [L(t)]n,l ∈ R is the (n, l)-th element of the Laplacian, L(t), of the communi-
cation graph G(t). From (4.4), the stacked auxiliary states evolve as
x˜t+1 = x˜t − βtLtx˜t + αtDᵀHKt (yt −DH x˜t) ,(4.6)
where
Kt = blkdiag (K1(t), . . . ,KN (t)) ,(4.7)
DH = blkdiag (H1, . . . ,HN ) .(4.8)
In the sequel, we use the evolution of the auxiliary states (4.4), to prove Theorem 3.1.
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4.2. Network Convergence. We now prove that the agents’ estimates con-
verge component-wise to the network average over the induced subgraphs Gm(t),
m = 1, . . . ,M . Define the M ×M matrix (where, recall, M is the dimension of the
parameter θ∗)
(4.9) D = diag
(
|J1|−1 , . . . , |JM |−1
)
.
Then, we define the M -dimensional generalized network average estimate as
(4.10) xt = D (1ᵀN ⊗ IM ) x˜t.
Note that each component m = 1, . . . ,M of xt follows [xt]m =
1
|Jm|
∑N
n=1 [x˜n(t)]m =
1
|Jm|
∑
n∈Jm [x˜n(t)]m , since, if n /∈ Jm (i.e., if agent n is not interested in m), then,
by (4.1), [x˜n(t)]m = 0. That is, each component m of xt is the average estimate of
all agents interested in estimating [θ∗]m.
We are interested in analyzing x̂n(t) = x˜n(t) − xt, the difference between each
agent’s auxiliary state and the generalized network average estimate. For each agent
n, we only wish to consider the components of x̂n(t) that belong to the interest set
of agent n. Thus, instead of analyzing x̂n(t) directly, we analyze the behavior of
Qnx̂n(t), where Qn follows (4.2). Let
(4.11) x̂t = x˜t − (1N ⊗ IM ) xt,
stack x̂n(t) across all agents, and define the matrix
(4.12) Q = blkdiag (Q1, . . . , QN ) .
The following lemma describes the behavior of Qx̂t.
Lemma 4.1. Under SAFE, for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2, Qx̂t satisfies
(4.13) P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ3 ‖Qx̂t‖2 = 0
)
= 1.
To prove Lemma 4.1, we separately consider the network of agents interested in each
component of θ∗. We show that, for each component of θ∗, all interested agents reach
consensus, i.e., their estimates converge to the same value.
Proof. Recall that the set Jm, m = 1, . . . ,M , is the subset of all agents interested
in estimating [θ∗]m. Let Jm =
{
nm,1, . . . , nm,|Jm|
}
. For each agent n ∈ Jm, consider
the canonical basis (row) vector (of RNM ), eᵀ(n−1)M+m. This canonical vector selects
the element of the auxiliary state x˜t corresponding to agent n’s estimate of [θ
∗]m, i.e.,
eᵀ(n−1)M+mx˜t = [x˜n(t)]m . Now, construct the matrix Qm by stacking the canonical
row vectors eᵀ(n−1)M+m for all n ∈ Jm, i.e.,
(4.14) Qm =
[
e(nm,1−1)M+m · · · e(nm,|Jm|−1)M+m
]ᵀ
.
The matrixQm selects all of the interested agents’ (i.e., all agents n ∈ Jm) estimates of
[θ∗]m from the auxiliary state x˜t. For each component m = 1, . . . ,M , define the |Jm|-
dimensional vector x̂mt = Qmx̂t, which collects, from all interested agents n ∈ Jm,
the difference between each agent’s estimate of [θ∗]m and the average estimate of all
interested agents.
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From the dynamics (4.6) of the auxiliary state x˜t, x̂
m
t evolves according to
x̂mt+1 =
(
I|JM | − P|JM |,1 − βtLm(t)
)
x̂mt +
αtQm (INM − (1N1ᵀN )⊗D)DᵀHKt (yt −DH x˜t) ,
(4.15)
where, Lm(t) is the graph Laplacian of Gm(t), the subgraph induced by Jm, and,
following the definition in Lemma 7.1 in the appendix, P|Jm|,1 =
1
|Jm|1|Jm|1
ᵀ
|Jm|. By
definition (4.7) of Kt and the threshold γt, we have ‖Kt (yt −Dhx˜t)‖∞ ≤ γt, which
means that, for some finite constant, C1 > 0, we have
C1γt ≥ ‖Qm (INM − (1N1ᵀN )⊗D)DᵀHKt (yt −DH x˜t)‖2 .(4.16)
As a consequence of Assumption 6, the Laplacian matrices {Lm(t)} form an i.i.d.
sequence, and, by Assumption 7, we have λ2 (E [Lm(t)]) > 0. The evolution (4.15) of
x̂mt falls under the purview of Lemma 7.1 in the appendix, and we have
(4.17) P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ3 ‖x̂mt ‖2 = 0
)
= 1,
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2.
To proceed, letQ be the matrixQ with all zero rows removed. Then, by definition,
we have
∥∥Qx̂t∥∥2 = ‖Qx̂t‖2. Note that vector Qx̂t is a permutation of the vector[
x̂1ᵀt · · · x̂Mᵀt
]ᵀ
, which means that ‖Qx̂t‖2 =
∥∥Qx̂t∥∥2 ≤ ∑Mm=1 ‖x̂mt ‖2 . This
holds for every component m = 1, . . . ,M , so we have
(4.18) P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ3
M∑
m=1
‖x̂mt ‖2 = 0
)
= 1,
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2. Combining (4.18) with ‖Qx̂t‖2 ≤
∑M
m=1 ‖x̂mt ‖2
yields (4.13) and completes the proof.
4.3. Intermediate Result for Attack Modeling. We present an intermediate
result, which will be used to characterize the effect of the attack on xt.
Lemma 4.2. Let A1  0 (A1 ∈ Rk×k) be a symmetric, positive definite matrix
with minimum eigenvalue λmin (A1). For any x 6= 0, x ∈ Rk, and y ∈ Rk that
satisfy ‖y‖2 < λmin (A1) ‖x‖2 , there exists a symmetric, positive definite matrix A2
that satisfies
(4.19) A2x = A1x+ y.
Moreover, the minimum eigenvalue of A2 satisfies
(4.20) λmin (A2) ≥ λmin (A1)− ‖y‖2‖x‖−12 .
Lemma 4.2 studies the effect of perturbations on matrix-vector multiplication A1x
when the matrix A1 is postive definite. It states that, as long as the perturbation y is
not too strong, then, the result of the perturbed multiplication (A1x+ y), is equal to
the unperturbed multiplication A2x between the same vector x and another postive
definite matrix A2. We use Lemma 4.2 to study the effect of disturbances (from
attacks) on the evolution of linear dynamical systems whose dynamics are modeled
by positive definite matrices.
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Proof. We separately consider the cases where k = 1 and k > 1. If k = 1, (i.e.,
A1, x, and y are all scalars), then, setting A2 = A1 +
y
x immediately satisfies (4.19)
and (4.20). For scalars A1 and A2, λmin (A1) = A1 and λmin (A2) = A2. Since, by
definition, |y||x| < A1, we have A2 > 0, i.e., A2 is positive definite.
For k > 1, let δ = ‖y‖2‖x‖−12 , and let x̂ = ‖x‖2 e1, where e1 is the first canonical
basis vector of Rk. For any x 6= 0, there exists an orthogonal matrix V such that
x̂ = V x. Now, let ŷ = V y. We now show the existence of a symmetric positive
definite Â2 that satisfies
(4.21) Â2x̂ = Â1x̂+ ŷ,
where Â1 = V A1V
ᵀ. Note that, since V is an orthogonal matrix, A1 and Â1 = V A1V ᵀ
have the same eigenvalues.
We find a symmetric matrix Â3 that satisfies Â3x̂ = ŷ. Partition the vector ŷ as
ŷ =
[
ŷ1
ŷ2
]
, where ŷ1 ∈ R is the first element of ŷ and ŷ2 ∈ Rk−1 is the vector of the
remaining elements. Define the matrix Â3 as
(4.22) Â3 =
[
ŷ1 ‖x‖−12 ŷᵀ2 ‖x‖−12
ŷ2 ‖x‖−12 νIk−1
]
,
where ν > 0 and Ik−1 is the k−1 by k−1 identity matrix. Note that Â3 is a symmetric
matrix that satisfies Â3x̂ = ŷ. Setting Â2 = Â1 + Â3 satisfies (4.21). What remains is
to show that Â1+Â3 is positive definite and satisfies λmin
(
Â1 + Â3
)
≥ λmin
(
Â1
)
−δ.
We express Â2 as Â2 =
(
Â1 − δIk
)
+
(
Â3 + δIk
)
. Since Â1 is a symmetric,
positive definite matrix, it is diagonalizable over the reals: there exists an orthogonal
matrix Û1 and a diagonal matrix Λ1 such that Â1 = Û1Λ1Û
ᵀ
1 , which means that
Â1 − δIk = Û1 (Λ1 − δIk) Ûᵀ1 , and
(4.23) λmin
(
Â1 − δIk
)
= λmin
(
Â1
)
− δ.
To proceed, we find ν > 0 (from the definition of Â3 (4.22)) such that Â3 + δIk
is positive semidefinite. From (4.22), we have
(4.24) Â3 + δIk =
[
ŷ1 ‖x‖−12 + δ ŷᵀ2 ‖x‖−12
ŷ2 ‖x‖−12 (ν + δ)Ik−1
]
.
Applying Proposition 16.1 from [15] (Lemma 7.4 in the appendix), we have that
Â3 + δIk  0 if and only if
(4.25) ŷ1 ‖x‖−12 + δ − ‖ŷ2‖22 ‖x‖−22 (ν + δ)−1 ≥ 0.
Let b = ŷ1‖x‖−12 . Since ‖ŷ‖2 = ‖V y‖2 = ‖y‖2, we have |b| = |ŷ1|‖x‖−12 ≤ ‖ŷ‖2‖x‖−12 =
δ. We express ‖ŷ2‖22 ‖x‖−22 as
(4.26) ‖ŷ2‖−22 ‖x‖22 =
(
‖ŷ‖22 − ŷ21
)
‖x‖−22 = δ2 − b2.
Using (4.26), and performing algebraic manipulations, (4.25) becomes
(4.27) b2 + (δ + ν) b+ δν ≥ 0.
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The roots of the expression on the left hand side of (4.27) are b = −ν and b = −δ.
That is, as long as ν ≥ δ, then, b2 + (δ + ν) b + δν ≥ 0 for all −δ ≤ b ≤ δ, which
means that Â3 + δIk  0 as long as ν ≥ δ.
The sum of a positive definite and a positive semidefinite matrix is positive defi-
nite. Since Â3 + δIk  0 and Â1 − δIk  0, we have
(4.28) Â2 =
(
Â1 − δIk
)
+
(
Â3 + δIk
)
 0.
Moreover, since Â3 + δIk  0, we have
(4.29) λmin
(
Â2
)
≥ λmin
(
Â1 − δIk
)
= λmin
(
Â1
)
− δ.
Setting A2 = V
ᵀÂ2V yields (4.19) and (4.20), which completes the proof.
4.4. Generalized Network Average Behavior. This subsection analyzes the
evolution of the generalized network average estimate xt. In particular, we show that
xt converges a.s. to θ
∗ under the resilience condition (3.7). Let
(4.30) et = xt − θ∗
be the generalized network average estimate error. To analyze the behavior of et, we
require the following definitions:
k˜p(t) =
{
kp(t), p ∈ N ,
0, p ∈ A,(4.31)
KNt = diag
(
k˜1(t), . . . , k˜p(t)
)
,(4.32)
KAt = Kt −KNt ,(4.33)
wt =
[
w1(t)
ᵀ · · · wN (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
.(4.34)
The following lemma characterizes the relationship between the generalized net-
work average estimate and the threshold γt. In our previous work [8], we established
a similar result for resilient distributed parameter estimation (Lemma 2 in [8]). Here,
we consider the resilient distributed field estimation problem.
Lemma 4.3. Define the auxiliary threshold
(4.35) γt = γt −
X
(t+ 1)τ3
− W
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
,
where, recall, from the weight selection procedure in Section 3.1, γt =
Γ
(t+1)τγ (Γ > 0
is an arbitrary positive constant), τ3 = τγ +τ1−τ2−X for arbitrarily small 0 < X <
τ1 − τ2, 0 < W < 12 − τγ . As long as λmin (GN ) > ∆A (resilience condition (3.7)),
then there exists a.s. T0 ≥ 0, 0 < X <∞, and 0 < W <∞ such that
1. ‖Qx̂t‖2 ≤ X(t+1)τ3 a.s.,
2. ‖wt‖2 ≤ W
(t+1)
1
2
−τγ , a.s., and,
3. if, for any T ≥ T0, ‖eT ‖2 ≤ γT , then, for all t ≥ T , ‖et‖2 ≤ γt a.s.
Compared to the proof of Lemma 2 in [8] (for distributed parameter estimation), the
proof of Lemma 4.3 for the distributed field estimation setup requires new technical
tools that we develop in this paper. Specifically, the proof of Lemma 4.3 requires
Lemma 4.2 from the previous subsection to analyze the effect of attacks.
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To prove Lemma 4.3, we show that conditions 1) and 2) hold as a result of existing
Lemmas (Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 7.5 in the appendix). We then study the evolution
of the network average estimation error et along sample paths that satisfy conditions
1) and 2). Along these sample paths, we show that condition 3) holds by analyzing
the estimate update step of SAFE. Finally, since the set of sample paths on which
conditions 1) and 2) hold has probability measure 1, we show that condition 3) also
holds with probability 1.
Proof. Step 1 (Satisfying conditions 1) and 2).): By Lemmas 4.1 and 7.5 (in the
appendix), we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ3 ‖Qx̂t‖2 = 0
)
= 1,(4.36)
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0 ‖wt‖2 = 0
)
= 1,(4.37)
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1− τ2 and every 0 ≤ δ0 < 12 . That is, the set of sample paths
Ω
′ ⊂ Ω on which limt→∞(t + 1)δ0 ‖wt,ω‖2 = 0 and limt→∞(t + 1)τ3 ‖x̂t,ω‖2 = 0 has
probability measure 1. For each sample path ω ∈ Ω′ , there exists finite Xω and Wω
such that
‖Qx̂t,ω‖2 ≤
Xω
(t+ 1)τ3
, ‖wt,ω‖2 ≤
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
,(4.38)
where the notation x̂t,ω and wt,ω mean x̂t and wt along the sample path ω.
Step 2 (Dynamics of et):We now consider the evolution of et. From (4.6), we
have that xt evolves according to
(4.39) xt+1 = xt + αtD (1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKt (yt −DH x˜t) .
To derive (4.39) from (4.6), we have used the fact that (1ᵀN ⊗ IM ) Lt = 0. Recall, the
definition of Qn, that for each agent n, HnQn = Hn, which means that DHQ = DH .
We express DHxt as
DHxt = DH (1N ⊗ IM ) xt +DHQx̂t.(4.40)
Then, using the fact that Kt = K
N
t + K
A
t and substituting (4.40) into (4.39), we find
that et = xt − θ∗ evolves according to
et+1 =
IM − αtD∑
p∈N
kp(t)hph
ᵀ
p
 et−
αtD (1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀH
(
KNt (DHQx̂t −wt) + KAt (yt −DH x˜t)
)(4.41)
Let bt = (1
ᵀ
N ⊗ IM )DᵀHKAt (yt −DH x˜t) model the effect of the attack on the evo-
lution of et. Recall that, by definition of the kp(t) and K
A
t (equations (3.5) and (4.33)),
we have
∥∥KAt (yt −DH x˜t)∥∥∞ ≤ γt. Then, from the definition of ∆A, we have
(4.42) ‖bt‖2 ≤ ∆Aγt.
Note that γt = γt +X(t+ 1)
τ3 +W (t+ 1)
1
2−W , which means that we may partition
bt as
(4.43) bt = bt + b˜t,
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where
∥∥∥b˜t∥∥∥
2
≤ ∆A
(
X(t+ 1)τ3 +W (t+ 1)
1
2−W
)
and
∥∥bt∥∥2 ≤ ∆Aγt.
Step 3 (Pathwise analysis of et): Next, we study the evolution of et,ω for sample
paths ω ∈ Ω′ . We show that, for sufficiently large T0, if, for some T ≥ T0, ‖eT,ω‖2 ≤
γT,ω, then, for all t ≥ T , ‖et,ω‖2 ≤ γt,ω. For the noncompromised measurement
streams p ∈ N , by the triangle inequality, we have∣∣∣y(p)n (T, ω)− hᵀpxn(T, ω)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣hᵀp (Qn (xT,ω − x˜n (T, ω))− et)∣∣+ |wpn(T, ω)| ,(4.44)
≤ ‖eT,ω‖2 + ‖Qx̂T,ω‖2 + ‖wT,ω‖2 ,(4.45)
≤ γT,ω +
Xω
(T + 1)τ3
+
Wω
(T + 1)
1
2−W
= γt,(4.46)
which means that kp(t) = 1 for all p ∈ N . Then, using the fact that
∑
p∈N hph
ᵀ
p = GN ,
from (4.41), we have
eT+1,ω = eT,ω − αTD
(
GNeT,ω + bT,ω + b˜T,ω
)
−
αTD (1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKNT,ω (DHQx̂T,ω −wT,ω) .
(4.47)
Further, using the fact that ∆A ≤ |A| and |A|+ |N | = P , we have
‖eT+1,ω‖2≤
∥∥(IM − αTDGN ) eT,ω+αTDbT,ω∥∥2+ αTPXωJ(T + 1)τ3+ αTPWωJ(T + 1) 12−W ,(4.48)
where J = minm=1,...,M |Jm| .
Let
e∗T,ω = arg max
e∈RM , ‖e‖2≤γT,ω
∥∥∥(IM − αTDGN)e + αTDbT,ω∥∥∥
2
.(4.49)
Since ‖eT,ω‖2 ≤ γT,ω, eT,ω is a feasible solution for the optimization problem above,
which means that
‖eT+1,ω‖2≤
∥∥(IM − αTDGN ) e∗T,ω+αTDbT,ω∥∥2+ αTPXωJ(T + 1)τ3+ αTPWωJ(T + 1) 12−W .(4.50)
Because e∗T,ω maximizes a convex function over a closed convex set, it belongs to
the boundary of the convex set, i.e.,
∥∥e∗T,ω∥∥2 = γT,ω. Note that ∥∥bT,ω∥∥2 ≤ γT,ω <
λmin (GN )
∥∥e∗T,ω∥∥2, which, by Lemma 4.2, means that there exists G∗T,ω  0 such that
(4.51) G∗T,ωe∗T,ω = GNe∗T,ω + bT,ω
with a minimum eigenvalue that satisfies
(4.52) λmin
(G∗T,ω) ≥ κ = λmin (GN )−∆A.
Substituting (4.51) into (4.50), we have
‖eT+1,ω‖2 ≤
∥∥(IM − αTDG∗T,ω) e∗T,ω∥∥2 + αTPXωJ(T + 1)τ3+ αTPWωJ(T + 1) 12−W .(4.53)
18
The matrix DG∗T,ω is similar to the matrix D
1
2G∗T,ωD
1
2 . Using the fact that, for T large
enough,
∥∥IM − αTDG∗T,ω∥∥2 ≤ 1− αTκJ , where J = maxm=1,...,M |JM |, (4.53) becomes
(4.54) ‖eT+1,ω‖2 ≤
(
1− αTκ
J
)
γT,ω +
αTP (Xω +Wω)
J(T + 1)τ4
,
where τ4 = min
(
τ3,
1
2 − W
)
.
Step 4 (Satisfying condition 3.): From (4.54), we show that for T large enough,
‖eT+1‖2 ≤ γT+1,ω. It suffices to show that
(4.55) ‖eT+1‖2 ≤
(
T + 1
T + 2
)τγ
γT,ω,
since
(
T+1
T+2
)τγ
γT,ω < γT+1,ω. Note that we may express γt as
(4.56) γt =
Γ− X
(t+1)τ3−τγ − W(t+1) 12−W−τγ
(t+ 1)τγ
.
The numerator in (4.56) increases in t, which means that, for any 0 < Γ < Γ, there
exists a finite T such that γt >
Γ
(t+1)τγ for all t ≥ T . Thus, for any 0 < Γ < Γ, there
exists a finite T that is sufficiently large so that (4.54) becomes
(4.57) ‖eT+1,ω‖2 ≤ (1− αT ρT,ω) γT,ω,
where
(4.58) ρT,ω =
κ
J
− P (Xω +Wω)
ΓJ(T + 1)τ4−τγ
.
The second term in ρT,ω decays to 0 as T increases, so, for sufficiently large T ,
ρT,ω ≥ 0.
Substituting for (4.57) and applying the inequality (1−x) ≤ e−x for x ≥ 0, (4.55)
becomes −αT ρT,ω ≤ τγ log
(
T+1
T+2
)
. Further applying the inequality log
(
T+1
T+2
)
≥
1− T+2T+1 = − 1T+1 , a sufficient condition for (4.55) is
(4.59) αT ρT,ω ≥ τγ
T + 1
.
By definition of ρT,ω, for any 0 < ρ <
κ
J
, there exists a sufficiently large finite T ,
such that ρT,ω > ρ. Then, for sufficiently large T , a sufficient condition for (4.59)
becomes aρ(T+1)τ1 >
τγ
T+1 , which is satisfied for all T ≥
(
τγ
aρ
) 1
1−τ1 − 1. Thus, there
exists a sufficiently large finite T0 such that, if ‖eT,ω‖2 ≤ γT,ω for any T ≥ T0, then‖eT+1,ω‖2 ≤ γT+1,ω. The same analysis above applies to all t = T + 1, T + 2, . . . ,
which means that ‖et,ω‖2 ≤ γt,ω for all t ≥ T . This holds on all sample paths ω ∈ Ω
′
,
i.e., almost surely.
Using the previous result (Lemma 4.3), we now study the convergence of the
generalized network average estimate to the true value of the parameter.
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Lemma 4.4 (Generalized Network Average Consistencys). If λmin (GN ) > ∆A,
then, under SAFE, for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
,
(4.60) P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0
)
= 1.
We prove Lemma 4.4 by studying the behavior of et pathwise over the set of sample
paths where Lemma 4.3 holds. Along each sample path, we show that SAFE bounds
the perturbance from the attack on the evolution of et. We use Lemma 4.2 to model
the perturbed (as a result of the attack) dynamics of et using an unperturbed dynamics
matrix, and then use Lemma 7.6 in the appendix to show that ‖et‖2 converges to 0.
Proof. Consider the set of sample paths Ω
′
on which Lemma 4.3 holds. The set Ω
′
has probability measure 1. For each sample path ω ∈ Ω′ , there exists finite T0,ω such
that, if at any T ≥ T0,ω, we have ‖eT,ω‖2 ≤ γT,ω, then, we have ‖et,ω‖2 ≤ γt,ω for all
t ≥ T . We now analyze ‖et,ω‖2 for t ≥ T0,ω. For each sample path ω, there are two
possibilities: either 1. there exists T such that ‖eT,ω‖2 ≤ γT,ω, or 2. ‖et,ω‖2 ≥ γt,ω
for all t ≥ T0,ω. If the first case occurs, then, as a consequence of Lemma 4.3, we have
‖et,ω‖2 ≤ Γ(t+1)τγ , for all t ≥ T0,ω, which means that limt→∞(t+ 1)τ0 ‖et,ω‖2 = 0 for
every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ .
If the second case occurs, then, for all t ≥ T0,ω, we have ‖et,ω‖2 > γt,ω. Define
(4.61) K̂t,ω =
γt,ω +
Xω
(t+1)τ3 +
Wω
(t+1)
1
2
−W
‖et,ω‖2 + Xω(t+1)τ3 + Wω(t+1) 12−W
.
The numerator in (4.61) is equal to the threshold γt. Since the sample path ω is chosen
from a set on which Lemma 4.3 holds, we have ‖Qx̂t,ω‖2 ≤ Xω(t+1)τ3 and ‖wt‖2 ≤
Wω
(t+1)
1
2
−W
. Thus, as a consequence of (4.45), the denominator in (4.61) is greater
than or equal to
∣∣∣y(p)n (t, ω)− hᵀpxn(t, ω)∣∣∣ for all uncompromised measurement streams
p ∈ N , which means that, for all p ∈ N , we have
(4.62) K̂t,ω ≤ kp (t, ω) .
That is, K̂t,ω is a lower bound on the saturating gains kp(t, ω) for all measurement
uncompromised measurement streams. Define the matrix G˜t,ωN =
∑
p∈N kp(t, ω)hph
ᵀ
p ,
and note that, as a consequence of (4.62), we have G˜t,ωN  K̂t,ωGN , where, recall,
GN =
∑
p∈N hph
ᵀ
p .
Rearranging (4.61), we have
(4.63) γt = K̂t,ω
(
‖et,ω‖2 +
Xω
(t+ 1)τ3
+
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
)
.
Recall, from the proof of Lemma 4.3, that we let bt =
(
1ᵀN⊗IM
)
DᵀHK
A
t
(
yt−DH x˜t
)
represent the effect of the attack on the evolution of et, and, by (4.42), we have
‖bt‖ ≤ ∆Aγt. For each sample path ω, we partition bt,ω (differently from the partition
in (4.43)) as bt,ω = bt,ω + b˜t,ω, where∥∥bt,ω∥∥2 ≤ K̂t,ω∆A ‖et,ω‖2 ,(4.64) ∥∥∥b˜t,ω∥∥∥
2
≤ K̂t,ω∆A
(
Xω
(t+ 1)τ3
+
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
)
.(4.65)
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Substituting for G˜t,ωN and bt into the dynamics of et (equation (4.41)) and taking the
`2-norm of both sides, we have
‖et+1,ω‖2 ≤
∥∥∥(IM − αtDG˜t,ωN ) et,ω+αtDbt,ω∥∥∥
2
+
αtPXω
J(t+ 1)τ3
+
αtPWω
J(t+ 1)
1
2−W
.(4.66)
From the resilience condition (3.7) and the definition of G˜t,ωN we have λmin
(
G˜t,ωN
)
>
K̂t,ωλmin (GN ) > K̂t,ω∆A, which, substituting into (4.64) means that∥∥bt,ω∥∥2 < λmin (G˜t,ωN ) ‖et,ω‖2 .(4.67)
As a result of (4.67) and Lemma 4.2, there exists a positive definite matrix G∗t,ω such
that G∗t,ωet,ω = G˜t,ωN et,ω + bt,ω with a minimum eigenvalue that satisfies
(4.68) λmin
(G∗t,ω) ≥ λmin (G˜t,ωN )− K̂t,ω∆A > K̂t,ωκ,
where, by definition (4.52), κ = λmin (GN )−∆A. Substituting for G∗t,ωet,ω = G˜t,ωN et,ω+
bt,ω in (4.66) and using the fact that the matrix DG∗t,ω is similar to the matrix
D 12G∗t,ωD
1
2 , we have
(4.69) ‖et+1,ω‖2 ≤
(
1− αtK̂t,ωκ
J
)
‖et,ω‖2 +
αtPRω
J(t+ 1)τ4
,
where τ4 = min
(
τ3,
1
2 − W
)
, Rω = Xω+Wω, and J and J are the largest and smallest
sizes, respectively, of the sets Jm. By definition of K̂t,ω, we have
(4.70) K̂t,ω > Γ
(
(t+ 1)τγ
(‖et,ω‖2 +Rω))−1 .
Substituting for (4.70) in its right hand side, we see that (4.69) falls under the purview
of Lemma 7.6 in the appendix, which means that
(4.71) lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et,ω‖2 = 0,
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < τ4 − τγ = min
(
τ3 − τγ , 12 − W − τγ
)
. Recall that, by definition,
τ3 = τγ+τ1−τ2−X and τγ < min
(
1
2 , τ1 − τ2, 1− τ1
) ≤ min ( 12 , τ1 − τ2). Taking X >
0 and W > 0 to be arbitrarily small, (4.71) holds for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
.
The set of sample paths Ω
′
for which the above analysis holds has probability measure
1, yielding the desired result (4.60).
4.5. Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. From the triangle inequality, we have∥∥xn(t)− θ∗In∥∥2 = ∥∥∥Qn(x˜n(t)− θ∗)∥∥∥2 ≤ ‖Qx̂t‖2 + ‖et‖2 .(4.72)
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.4 state that, if λmin (GN ) > ∆A (resilience condition (3.7)), then
P
(
limt→∞ (t+ 1)
τ3 ‖Qx̂t‖2 = 0
)
= 1, and P
(
limt→∞(t + 1)τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0
)
= 1, for
every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2 and every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
. Combining these
relations with (4.72) yields the desired result: for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
,
(4.73) P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0
∥∥xn(t)− θ∗In∥∥2 = 0) = 1.
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5. Numerical Examples. For numerical simulation, we consider a network of
625 robots or agents (depicted in Figure 1) sensing an unknown two dimensional
environment.3 The communication network is a two dimensional (25 node by 25
node) mesh lattice network. We represent the environment as a 230 unit by 230 unit
grid. Each location in the grid is represented by the tuple (i, j), i, j = 0, . . . , 229. Let
(5.1) E = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 299}}
be the set of all location coordinates in the environment. We assign each unit square
(i, j) in the environment a state value, which takes values on the interval [0, 255]. The
state value represents, for example, the occupancy of a particular location: a value of
0 may represent a location that is free of obstacles, while a value of 255 may represent
a location that is occupied by an impassable obstacle. The field parameter θ∗ is the
collection of state values for each of the grid locations. The state value of location
(i, j) is found at the mth(i,j) component of θ
∗, where
(5.2) m(i,j) = 230 · i+ j.
The dimension of θ∗ is 52, 900. We represent the field θ∗ using the 230 pixel by 230
Fig. 1: A team of 625 agents, connected by a mesh communication network, (left) measures
θ∗, the state values of a 230 by 230 two dimensional grid environment, represented by the
image of the baboon (right). Each pixel of the image represents the state value of a single
location. The red diamonds represent agents with compromised measuremnt streams.
pixel image of the baboon in Figure 1, where the intensity of each pixel represents
the state value of a particular location.
The agents are placed uniformly throughout the environment. We place each
agent n (n = 1, 2, . . . , N) into the square (in, jn), where
in =
⌊
n− 1
230
⌋
, jn = mod (n− 1, 230) .(5.3)
In (5.3), the floor operator bxc computes the largest integer smaller than or equal to
x, and the modulo operator mod(x, y) computes the remainder of dividing x by y.
Each agent (robot) measures the state values of all locations in a 29 unit by 29 unit
square, centered at its own location. That is, each agent n measures the state value
of all locations (i, j) belonging to the set
(5.4) E˜n =
{
(i, j) ∈ E
∣∣∣ |i− in| ≤ 29, |j − jn| ≤ 29} .
3Code for the numerical simulation is found at https://github.com/ychen824/SAFE.
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Equation (5.2) provides a one-to-one mapping between coordinates (i, j) ∈ E and
field components m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. For a coordinate (i, j), let eᵀm(i,j) , be the mth(i,j)
canoncial row vector of RM . Then, following (2.1), the measurement of agent n
(without attacks) is,
(5.5) yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ + wn(t),
where the measurement matrix Hn stacks all of the row vectors e
ᵀ
m(i,j)
for every
(i, j) ∈ E˜n. The physical coupling set of agent n is
(5.6) I˜n =
{
m(i,j)
∣∣∣(i, j) ∈ E˜n} ,
where, recall, from (5.2), m(i,j) = 230 · i + j. For every agent, each of its scalar
measurement streams is affected by i.i.d. (in time) Gaussian measurement noise with
mean 0 and variance σ2 = 50. The noise is independent across measurement streams.
Each agent is interested in the state values of all locations in a 57 unit by 57 unit
square, centered at its own location, i.e., each agent n is interested in estimating the
state values of all locations in the set
(5.7) En =
{
(i, j) ∈ E
∣∣∣ |i− in| ≤ 57, |j − jn| ≤ 57} .
The interest of agent n is
(5.8) In =
{
m(i,j)
∣∣∣(i, j) ∈ En} .
Note that each agent is interested in components of the field θ∗ that it does not
directly measure, i.e., there exist components m ∈ In that do not belong to I˜n. Thus,
agents must rely on communication with neighbors to estimate their components of
interest. An adversary compromises all of the measurement streams of 70 agents
(11.2% of the agents), chosen uniformly at random without replacement, shown as
the red diamonds in Figure 1. The adversary changes the value of each measurement
stream under attack (p ∈ A) to y(p)(t) = 255.
We compare the performance, averaged over 100 trials, of SAFE against the per-
formance of CIRFE, the distributed field estimator from [28], which did not consider
measurement attacks. We use the following weights: a = 1, b = 0.0839, τ1 = 0.26, τ2 =
0.001,Γ = 40, τγ = 0.25. Figure 2a shows the evolution of the maximum estimation
root mean squared error (RMSE) over all agents, normalized by the square root of
the size of each agent’s interest set, for SAFE and CIRFE, the estimator from [28].
Under SAFE, the agents’ local estimation error converges to zero, even when there
is an adversary. In contrast, under the estimator from [28], the adversary causes a
significant error in some of the agents’ estimates. Figure 2b shows the reconstructed
field from SAFE and the estimator from [28], where, for each component of the field
(i.e., for each pixel in the image), we take the worst estimate among all agents inter-
sted in that component. Similar to Figure 2a, Figure 2b shows that SAFE allows the
agents consistently estimate the components of the field in which they are interested
while under adversarial attack. The same adversarial attacks induce significant errors
in the estimation results of agents following CIRFE, an estimator that does not have
proper countermeasures against measurement attacks.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) Evolution of the maximum root mean square error (RMSE) over all agents,
normalized by square root of the size of the agent’s interest set, for SAFE and CIRFE [28].
(b) Estimation results for SAFE (left) and CIRFE [28] (right) under measurement attacks.
6. Conclusion. In this paper, we have studied resilient distributed field esti-
mation under measurement attacks. A team of agents or devices, connected by a
cyber communication network, makes measurements of a large, spatially distributed
physical field, and each agent processes the measurements to recover specific com-
ponents of the field. For example, in multi-robot navigation, a team of connected
robots takes measurements of an unknown environment and each robot processes its
measurements to estimate its local surroudings. An adversary arbitrarily manipu-
lates a subset of the measurements. To deal with the measurement attacks, this
paper presented SAFE, the Saturating Adaptive Field Estimator, a resilient con-
sensus+innovations distributed field estimator. Under SAFE, each agent applies
an adaptive gain to its innovations component to saturate its magnitude at a time-
decaying threshold. As long as the subnetwork of agents interested in each component
of the field is connected on average, and there is enough measurement redundancy in
the noncompromised measurement streams, then, SAFE guarantees that all of the
agents’ local estimates converge almost surely true value of the components of the
field in which they are interested. Finally, we illustrated the performance of SAFE
through numerical examples.
7. Appendix. We require intermediate results from [6, 8, 15] to prove Theo-
rem 3.1. For completeness, we provide proof sketches for Lemmas 7.1 and 7.6, origi-
nally from [8].
7.1. Consensus Analysis. We use the following result, a consequence of Lemma 1
in [8] to study the convergence of the agents’ estimates to the generalized network
average estimate.
Lemma 7.1 (Lemma 1 in [8]). Define the consensus subspace
(7.1) C = {w ∈ RNM |w = 1N ⊗ v, v ∈ RM} ,
and let C⊥ be the orthogonal complement of C. Let ŵt ∈ C⊥ be Ft-adapted and evolve
according to
(7.2) ŵt+1 = (INM − PNM − r2(t)L(t)) ŵt + r1(t)vt,
where:
1. PNM =
1
N (1N1
ᵀ
N )⊗ IM ,
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2. the sequences {r1(t)} and {r2(t)} follow r1(t) = c1(t+1)δ1 , r2(t) = c2(t+1)δ2 , with
c1, c2 > 0, 0 < δ2 < δ1, and δ2 < 1.
3. the term vt satisfies ‖vt‖2 ≤ c3(t+1)δ3 , with 0 < δ3 < min
(
1
2 , δ1 − δ2
)
and
c3 > 0, and
4. the sequence {L(t)} is an Ft+1-adapted, i.i.d. sequence of (undirected) graph
Laplacian matrices that satisfies λ2 (E [L(t)]) > 0.
Then, for every 0 ≤ δ < δ3 + δ1 − δ2, ŵt satisfies
(7.3) P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
δ ‖ŵt‖2 = 0
)
= 0.
The proof sketch of Lemma 7.1 requires two results from [21]. The following result
(Lemma 4.4 in [21]) characterizes the effect of random, time-varying Laplacians on
the evolution of ŵt in (7.2).
Lemma 7.2 (Lemma 4.4 in [21]). Consider ŵt defined in (7.2), subject to the
conditions 1. – 4. stated in Lemma 7.1. There exists a measurement Ft+1-adapted
process {r(t)} and a constant cr > such that, for t large enough,
0 ≤ r(t) ≤ 1, a.s.,(7.4)
cr
(t+ 1)δ2
≤ E [r(t)|Ft] ,(7.5)
‖(INM − r2(t)L(t)) ŵt‖2 ≤ (1− r(t)) ‖ŵt‖2 , a.s.,(7.6)
where the sequence {r2(t)} and the constant δ2 satisfy condition 2. from Lemma 7.1.
The following result from [21] studies the evolution of scalar dynamical systems
of the form
(7.7) wt+1 = (1− r(t))wt + r1(t),
where {r1(t)} is a deterministic sequence that follows, r1(t) = c1(t+1)δ1 , {r(t)} is Ft+1-
adapted process satisfying 0 ≤ r(t) ≤ 1, a.s. and cr
(t+1)δ2
≤ E [r(t)|Ft], and the con-
stants c1, cr, δ1, δ2 satisfy, c1, cr > 0, 0 < δ2 < δ1, δ2 < 1.
Lemma 7.3 (Lemma 4.2 in [21]). The system in (7.7) satisfies
(7.8) P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0wt = 0
)
= 1,
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 − δ2.
For completeness, we now provide the proof sketch for Lemma 7.1. The full proof
is found in [8].
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Consider the dynamics of ŵt (equation (7.2)). Since, by
definition, ŵt ∈ C⊥, we have
(7.9) PNM ŵt = 0.
Then, substituting (7.9) into (7.2), taking the `2-norm of both sides, and applying
the triangle inequality, we have
(7.10) ‖ŵt+1‖2 ≤ ‖(INM − r2(t)L(t)) ŵt‖2 + r1(t) ‖vt‖2 .
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From conditions 1. and 3. stated in Lemma 7.1, we have
(7.11) r1(t) ‖vt‖2 ≤
c1c3
(t+ 1)δ1+δ3
.
From Lemma 7.2, we have
(7.12) ‖(INM − r2(t)L(t)) ŵt‖2 ≤ (1− r(t)) ‖ŵt‖2 ,
where r(t) satisfies (7.4) and (7.5). Substituting (7.11) and (7.12) into (7.10) yields
(7.13) ‖ŵt+1‖2 ≤ (1− r(t)) ‖ŵt‖2 +
c1c3
(t+ 1)δ1+δ3
.
The relation in (7.13) falls under the purview of Lemma 7.3, which yields the desired
result.
7.2. Postive Semi-Definite Block Matrices. We use the following result
from [15] to establish the positive semi-definiteness of symmetric matrices.
Lemma 7.4 (Proposition 16.1 in [15]). LetM be a symmetric matrix of the form
M =
[
A Bᵀ
B C
]
. If C  0, then, M 0 if and only if A−BᵀC−1B  0.
7.3. Convergence of Averaged Noise. The following result from [6] charac-
terizes the behavior of the averaged measurement noise in the agents’ time-averaged
measurements.
Lemma 7.5 (Lemma 5 in [6]). Let v1, v2, v3, . . . be i.i.d. random variables with
mean E [vt] = 0 and finite covariance E [vtvᵀt ] = Σ. Then, we have
(7.14) P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0 ‖vt‖2 = 0
)
= 1,
where vt =
1
t+1
∑t
j=0 vj for all 0 ≤ δ0 < 12 .
7.4. Generalized Average Analysis. We use the following Lemma, a conse-
quence of Lemma 3 in [8], to study the behavior of the generalized network average
estimate.
Lemma 7.6 (Lemma 3 in [8]). Consider the scalar, time-varying dynamical sys-
tem
(7.15) wt+1 =
(
1− r1(t)c3
(|wt|+ ĉ3) (t+ 1)δ3
)
wt +
r1(t)c4
(t+ 1)δ4
,
where r1(t) =
c1
(t+1)δ1
, c3, ĉ3, c4 > 0, 0 < δ3 < δ4 < δ1, and δ3 + δ1 < 1. Then, for
every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ4 − δ3, the system state wt satisfies
(7.16) lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
δ0 wt = 0.
For completeness, we outline the proof of Lemma 7.6.
Proof of Lemma 7.6. First, we analyze scalar, time-varying dynamical systems of
the form
m̂t+1 =
(
1− r2(t)
mt + c5
)
mt + r1(t),
mt+1 = max (|mt| , |m̂t+1|) ,
(7.17)
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with initial condition m0 ≥ 0, where r1(t) = c1(t+1)δ1 , r2(t) = c2(t+1)δ2 , and c1, c2, c5 > 0.
Specifically, we show that, under (7.17), mt satisfies
(7.18) sup
t≥0
mt <∞.
We show that there exists finite T > 0 such that mT+1 = mT .
Note that, by consturction, mt is non-negative and non-decreasing, and m1 > 0.
By definition, there exists T large enough such that r2(T )mT+c5 ≤ 1, which ensures that|m̂T+1| = m̂T+1. Then, for T large enough, a sufficient condition for mT+1 = mT is
mT −m̂T+1 ≥ 0. By performing algebraic manipulations on (7.17), we may show that
(7.19) mT − m̂T+1 = r2(T ) mT
mT + c5
− r1(T ).
The term mTmT+c5 increases in mT . Recall that mT nondecreasing and m1 > 0, so we
have
(7.20)
mT
mT + c5
≥ m1
m1 + c5
> 0.
Now, let c6 =
m1
m1+c5
. Substituting into (7.20), and performing algebraic manip-
ulations, we may show that sufficient condition for mT − m̂T+1 ≥ 0 is
(7.21) T ≥
(
c1
c2c6
) 1
δ1−δ2 − 1.
The right hand side of (7.21) is finite, so there exists finite T such that mT+1 = mT .
Since (7.21) is a sufficient condition, if the right hand side negative, then, taking
T = 1 satisfies mT+1 = mT . Further note that all t ≥ T also satisfy (7.21), which
means that mT = mT+1 = mT+2 = . . . . Then, we have supt≥0mt = mT < ∞,
yielding, (7.18).
Second, we now use (7.17) and (7.18) to analyze sup0≤j≤t |wj |. Define the scalar,
time-varying dynamical system
v̂t+1 =
(
1− r1(t)c3
(|vt|+ ĉ3) (t+ 1)δ3
)
vt +
r1(t)c4
(t+ 1)δ4
,
vt+1 = max (|vt| , |v̂t+1|) ,
(7.22)
where r1(t), r2(t), c3, ĉ3, c4, δ3, and δ4 have the same values as they do in (7.15), with
initial condition v0 = |w0|. By construction, we have
(7.23) vt ≥ sup
0≤j≤t
|wj | ,
for all t ≥ 0. The system in (7.22) is of the same form as the system in (7.17), which,
from (7.18), means that
(7.24) sup
t≥0
|wt| ≤ sup
t≥0
vt <∞.
Third, letting ŵ = supt≥0 |wt|, from (7.15), for t large enough, we have
(7.25) wt+1 ≤
(
1− r1(t)c3
(ŵ + ĉ3) (t+ 1)δ3
)
wt +
r1(t)c4
(t+ 1)δ4
.
The relation in (7.25) falls under the purview of Lemma 7.3, which yields the desired
result (7.16).
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